Introduction
This paper addresses a number of important issues relating to the quality of the information environment pre-and post-Enron. We investigate the impact of the scandal on the perceived quality of accounting information in terms of the market risk premium and auditor reputation. The link between the cost of capital and accounting information quality has recently been explored by Leuz and Verrecchia (2005) and Schipper (2004, 2005) . Easley and O'Hara (2004) identify a role for precise accounting information in reducing the cost of capital by reducing the information-based systemic risk of shares to uninformed investors. In this paper we focus on the contribution of audit assurance to the precision of such information. We find that there was a fall in information quality post-Enron across all auditors. We also find that the Enron scandal, at least temporoarily, adversely affected the market risk premium confirming that information quality is part of systematic risk.
The fall in the quality of the information environment has obvious adverse implications for the US audit industry, for accounting regulators and for the international competitiveness of US capital markets.
The immediate impact of the Enron scandal has been investigated using an event-based methodology. These studies find evidence that Andersen suffered an immediate loss of reputation that was reflected in a risk-adjusted decline in the value of the shares of its US clients relative to the effect on the clients of the other Big 5 accounting firms (Chaney and Philipich, 2002 , Krishnamurthy, Zhou and Zhou 2002 and Asthana, Balsam and Krishnan, 2003 . The fall identified in these studies can be attributed to a number of different effects. The most obvious of these is transitory, being a once-off reappraisal of the level of the reported earnings of auditor-related client portfolios. In this paper we focus on a less obvious but more lasting effect relating to the impact of Enron on the perceived quality of accounting information. A decline in information-quality may be reflected in the weight given to new earnings information by the market. If this is a market wide-effect and is part of market risk, it will lead to a rise in the market risk premium and a fall in the capitalization of future expected earnings.
We refine the long-window earnings response coefficient (ERC) methodology (Collins and Kothari, 1989, Kothari, 2001 ) in order to accommodate idiosyncratic changes in auditor-specific coefficients and changes in the market-wide risk premium.
This is important because it provides us with a measure of the systemic effect of the scandal and it enables us to distinguish between this effect and the individual auditor effect. In our analysis we regard the immediate reaction to the Enron scandal as a time fixed-effect that can be omitted using a fixed-effects estimator.
We highlight the fact that a problem of endogeneity arises in the final year of our study. This is because measurement and reporting of audited accounting earnings may have been affected by the Enron event itself making our explanatory variable endogenous. It is likely that audit partners became more diligent in ensuring the protection of their reputation by a stricter adherence to accounting principles and less aggressive earnings recognition strategies in the post-Enron environment. To deal with this problem we introduce a variable which is highly correlated with post-Enron audited earnings, but exogenous to the Enron event. Specifically, we instrument the post-Enron audited earnings using final year interims.
In a further contribution to the literature we provide a recursive Bayesian analysis of information processing that extends Holthausen and Verrecchia (1988) and Teoh and Wong (1993) to a dynamic context. This accommodates the possibility that the Enron crisis may have led to a retrospective revision of the precision of already announced earnings information as well as changing the perceived reliability of information post-Enron. We demonstrate that, in the dynamic context, an impactdecline in earnings response coefficients (ERCs) must imply a decline in the quality of post-Enron information. However, we identify a number of alternative adjustment paths from impact-to-equilibrium involving radically different profiles. For example, the case of immediate post-Enron zero-change in ERCs cannot be interpreted as indicating no deterioration in the quality of post-Enron information. Furthermore, in contrast to Teoh and Wong (1993) we also demonstrate that a rise in ERCs cannot unambiguously be attributed to an improvement in information quality.
Our analysis also implies zero-unity bounds on the weight given to earnings surprises. Our unrestricted coefficient estimates usually lie within these limits. We obtain point estimates of these weights that exceed, but are not significantly different from one. This is an interesting result given that most research does not specify an expected value for ERCs: 'It is rare to see research examining whether the estimated coefficient (for ERC) equals some predicted value' (Kothari, 2001, p. 143) .
We perform tests of cross-auditor restrictions and also test for pre-post-Enron equality of ERCs. These tests identify whether Andersen was the sole target for a downgrading of reputation or whether the effect was systemic. We find little evidence that ERCs differ across auditor pre-or post-Enron. Furthermore, ERCs are always lower in the post-Enron period confirming a systemic decline in auditor reputation.
We find that instrumenting for endogeneity matters for the significance of our results and reveals a decline in information quality that is accompanied by a rise in the market risk premium.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section two we present a generalized analysis of information processing. In section three we set out our research design.
The sample selection procedure, variable definitions and descriptive statistics are reported in section four and the results are reported in section five. A discussion of the results and conclusion is provided in the final section.
Recursive Information Processing
In this section we present three information processing scenarios. The first scenario introduces notation and shows the conditions under which past market prices are irrelevant as a prior in a recursive Bayesian context. The second scenario involves the introduction of noisy earnings signals and shows how the variance of priors relates to the precision of these signals. This is a generalization of Teoh and Wong (1993) , who assume that the precision of past price as a signal of current value is exogenously determined. We retain a distinction between Bayesian weights and capitalization factors in our analysis. This distinction is also maintained in the empirical implementation. The third scenario develops the analysis to deal with a structural break that affects the variance of priors and the variance of new signals differentially.
We use this to develop our research design for measuring and interpreting the change in ERCs in response to the Enron event.
The analysis here is based on similar principles to those underlying the recursive nature of the Kalman filter (Kalman 1960 , Harvey 1989 and applies the analysis of Dunne (2000) to a case of a structural break in the quality of information.
In our case the recursion is applied to the mean and not the variance. Values for the variance of signal-innovations and the variance of noise are assumed to be subjective and are therefore manipulated to suit the analysis instead of being part of the recursive up-dating and smoothing that takes place in the usual application of a Kalman filter.
This allows for a much simpler and more tractable set of results under various assumptions about the subjective variances. In particular, this approach is more amenable to analytical manipulation designed to reflect a structural break in the subjective variances resulting from an event such as Enron.
Scenario 1: Random walk earnings without noise
Suppose t P is the price of an asset that is traded publicly and t V the fundamental value of the asset in period t, where fundamental value is assumed to be derived from economic earnings. Let γ be a capitalization factor for economic earnings, t y assuming that this is capitalized as though it were received in perpetuity.
Let the natural log of capitalized economic earnings, { } What is notable about this scenario is that past price changes would be uninformative regarding the future and t P itself would be the best prediction of fundamental value of the asset in the future. In this case, newly revealed economic earnings information is all that matters for the up-dating of the price of the asset. The old price will simply be replaced with γ times the new earnings signal. The old price has no role in determining the new price. This gives the following quadratic in k;
Scenario 2: economic earnings observed with noise
Only one of the solutions to this gives a meaningful value for k as follows;
Although we obtain a similar sign in the derivative of ERC with respect to changes in 2 e σ the relation is more complex than in Teoh and Wong (1993) . In a dynamic context the derivative in question will not be observed in the immediate aftermath of the event. This is because in the transition to the long-run equilibrium the weight given to prior beliefs will be dependent on a mixture of the revised subjectively held pre-event precision and the post-event precision. Over time the prior will become dominated by signals having the post-event precision and so the ERC will reach a long-run equilibrium associated with this new equilibrium signal-to-noise ratio. This facilitates the generalization we discuss in scenario three. 
The first part of the expression on the right hand side is the same as in Teoh and Wong (1993) and the second part is a positive fraction as shown in Appendix 2. Thus the long-run change in the ERC w.r.t. a change in the variance of the noise in the earnings signal (applicable to all periods) must be negative but smaller than the derivative obtained by Teoh and Wong (1993) .
One way of interpreting this result is to note that the number of past signals (combined as a weighted average) used to form the prior, ensures that the prior is more reliable in general than any individual signal. Changes in the precision of all signals will therefore affect the precision of the prior less than it affects the precision of the most recently arrived signal. Thus, despite the fact that the Enron event may
have reduced the perceived precision of both new and past earnings signals, in the case where this change has been similar for all signals, the ERC will still have fallen.
Of course, it is possible that the perceived reliability of pre-Enron signals is affected significantly more than the reliability of the post-Enron signals. In a dynamic context this matters for the impact-effect immediately surrounding the event and this is something we considered in the third scenario below.
In Appendix 3 we also show that the ERC, or φ , can be expressed in a more insightful way as the solution to the following quadratic; σ . This is what we would expect for a case like Enron, although we allow even more generality in this relation in the discussion that follows.
Scenario 3: Differential revision of the precision of past and future earnings signals
Here we outline the ways in which an event such as Enron can modify the components that make up the post-event ERC and from this we determine the impactderivative. 2 For clarity we assume that pre-Enron the ERC is based on time invariant
, , , Teoh and Wong (1993) . We introduce subscripts on these parameters to indicate revised parameters in the light of the Enron event. We use the subscript π to denote retrospective revisions (i.e., to denote the revised pre-Enron parameters) and we use the subscript ρ to denote the revised parameters post-dating the event. Thus the post-Enron ERC can be written as follows; Appendix 1 shows that k k π > if we assume that the Enron event raised the subjective variance of the earnings signal such that ( ) The actual direction of change that occurred is an empirical matter and is the subject of our application. In Figure 1 below we illustrate diagrammatically various possible adjustment paths for ERC to the long-run equilibrium following an event such as
Enron. In all of the alternative paths an eventual decline in ERCs occur (i.e., postEnron information is of lower quality). The difference arises due to the effect of the Enron event on the revised perceptions of the quality of information pre-dating the event. Where this has deteriorated significantly more than the post-event information quality, there can actually be a positive impact-effect.
Insert Figure 1 about here

Research design
In this section we review issues relating to the estimation of ERCs and we describe the innovations we apply in our estimation procedures. One important aspect of our approach is to explicitly recognize the role of the capitalization factor in the relation between equity valuation and earnings. In estimating auditor-specific ERCs (φ ) we apply a multiple factor model that allows for different firm-specific capitalization factors ( γ ) that depend on firm-specific betas and changes in the riskfree rate of interest. We apply a nonlinear estimation approach to jointly estimate the implied time-varying risk premiums and auditor-specific ERCs. We then follow the literature in dealing with measurement error by applying a reverse regression technique. Finally, we deal with the issue of endogeneity arising from the possibility that there was a change in the auditor-specific characteristics of the manipulation of earnings information post-Enron. 
and by further simplification as; 1 ln ln 1
Although this is an appealing representation it has practical limitations. The changes in accounting earnings include noise and this can give rise to large negative declines that exceed 100%. This motivates our use of the following alternative representation which is obviously approximate especially for large values;
As in the extant literature the approximation error, along with the usual measurement error, is likely to be mitigated by our reverse regression approach outlined below.
We estimate ERCs that are constant across firms associated with particular auditors (indexed by j) and that differ pre-and post-Enron ( [ ] , j pre post φ ). We jointly estimate risk premia for various factors keeping these premia constant across firms. We allow the market risk premium to vary pre-and post-Enron. This leads to the nonlinear empirical specification given in equation (12) 
Unlike recent Enron-related event-based studies (Chaney and Philipich, 2002 , Krishnamurthy, Zhou and Zhou, 2002 , and Asthana, Balsam and Krishnan, 2003 we use a long-window (annual) ERC methodology to focus on the aspect of the earnings measurement process that relates to investor confidence in the reliability of audited earnings. The long-window approach has previously been employed by Collins and Kothari (1989) to investigate the determinants of ERCs. We use the actual change in earnings scaled by beginning period market value to proxy the unexpected change in earnings.
We apply adjustments to our variables to achieve a fixed-effect estimator. The fixed-effects approach deals with omitted variable bias and provides a structure for cross sectional restrictions. The omitted variables of concern are those for which the effects are constant over time but not across sector (i.e., industry-wide effects) and the effects that are constant for sectors but not across time (e.g., macroeconomic
conditions and the market-wide effect of the Enron event itself). The Enron fixedeffect is not of interest to our analysis so excluding this fixed-effect is of particular importance to achieving an unbiased estimated of the proportional relation between returns and earnings in the post-Enron period. Specifically, we demean returns and unexpected-earnings by year-end annual averages to exclude time fixed-effects. We then demean for cross-sectional fixed-effects by demeaning each time-demeaned observation for its sectoral-average across all periods pre-and post-Enron using SIC identifiers. In the case of market-to-book, leverage and size we are interested in the relation of each observation relative to its period-specific average so we only demean by the time period. This reflects the view that relative positions of these variables can be used to adjust firm-specific beta-based capitalization factors. We expect a positive adjustment to beta-based capitalization factors for relatively high market-to-book firms and likewise for relative size. A negative adjustment for relative leverage would indicate a reduction in capitalization reflecting the impact of financial risk.
Our ERC estimate should be viewed as a 'within estimator' as opposed to a 'between estimator' (Greene 2003, Bhattacharya, Daouk and Welker 2004) . Although there may be some benefit from a GLS estimation approach which combines the 'within' and 'between' estimates, we believe that the 'within estimator' is the most appropriate for our purposes since it is likely to be unbiased when measurement error is properly accounted for (Hausman and Taylor, 1987 ).
Demeaning will not, however, remove proportional-effects and therefore is unlikely to provide a noiseless estimate of the unexpected component of these variables. This introduces measurement error and we use a non-linear 'reverse regression' technique to deal with this and other sources of measurement error, such as those arising from the capitalization of earnings. In our empirical implementation, we refer to the regression model of equation (12) 
Our theoretical analysis suggests that market reaction to earnings information depends on the perceived precision of that information. The theory has direct empirical implications for the regression based relation between earnings surprises and the associated market reaction. In theory, auditor-specific ERCs are expected to differ from each other to reflect differential reputation effects. We test this proposition 
Data
Data and Sample Selection
The accounting data for this study are obtained from the Compustat database and market based data are extracted from CRSP. We identify the associated auditor for each company using the Compustat #149 identifier. We examine four years of preEnron data starting from 1998 and one year Post-Enron. We are restricted to a single Insert Table 2 about here
Variable definition and descriptive statistics
Results
Direct and Reverse regressions
The results for both the 'direct' and 'reverse' regressions as described by equations (12) and (13), respectively are reported in Table 3 . The results adjusting for endogeneity are reported in Table 4 . Regressions were produced using the RATS (Estima) 6.0 econometrics package using the robust errors option to control for the effects of serial correlation and heteroscedasticity. In the case of Table 3 , the direct and reverse regression coefficient estimates are directly comparable with each other since the inversion of the parameters in the reverse regression is implemented in the equations of the nonlinear estimation routine. The risk premiums are freely estimated in the direct and reverse regressions presented in Table 3 and also in the direct regression presented in Table 4 .
Our estimates of ERCs are not directly comparable with those reported in the existing literature but are consistent with the interpretation as Bayesian weights. We estimate the ERCs separately from the capitalization factor and this is not the usual practice. Our ERC estimates are plausible in that they remain close to their theoretical bounds from zero to one. Previous reverse-regression estimates of ERCs in the literature tend to exceed one.
The direct regression results presented in Table 3 show very low values for the ERCs when compared with the reverse regression. This is what would be expected in the case of measurement error. Indeed, it is well known that fixed-effects regression estimates tend to suffer from exacerbated downward bias due to measurement error (Lewbel, 1997) . While the ERC estimates are small in the direct regression they are all positive and significantly different from zero. The reverse regression ERCs are also all statistically significant and positive. Indeed in the pre-Enron period the point estimates exceed the maximum they could take theoretically. Although the point estimates are above unity they are not significantly different from unity. The reverse regression results therefore appear to suggest that the pre-Enron accounting information was of such quality that it merited full weight in determining the posterior belief about fundamentals to the exclusion of prior information. This is an extreme outcome and could be explained by measurement error in the returns process (e.g., a bubble in the market).
A comparison of the direct and reverse regressions indicates that measurement error is significant in its effects. On the basis of point estimates, the ranking of the auditors pre-and post Enron is more consistent in the reverse regression. Here the only change pre-and post Enron involves the improvement in Deloitte's ranking postEnron from 6 th largest to 4 th largest. Significantly, Andersen does not suffer a fall in its position. However, these rankings could easily be rejected on the basis of statistical significance. Despite measurement error, there is surprisingly little difference in the conclusions that can be drawn from the two alternative regressions regarding the risk premium. The estimated market risk premium is roughly 1.5% in the reverse regression and 1.7% in the direct regression. The direct and reverse regressions are also similar with regard to the signs of the factor risk premiums for market-to-book, leverage and size.
Overall, the sign and size of the estimated risk premiums accord with our expectations although there is no evidence of a systemic effect on the risk premium.
The negative estimated premium for relative market-to-book indicates the increased capitalization of future expected earnings as would be expected. The positive estimated premium on relative leverage indicates a reduction in capitalization reflecting the impact of financial risk. In the case of relative size the conclusion is similar to the case of market-to-book. The estimated market risk premium is quite plausible in both the direct and reverse regressions having controlled for market-tobook, leverage and size premiums.
Testing Restrictions
We use Wald tests to investigate whether auditor-specific ERCs differ from each other reflecting differential reputation effects in the pre-and post-Enron periods.
Under the null being true the test statistic is Chi-squared distributed with degrees of freedom equal to the number of restrictions being imposed. The test statistics are presented beneath the associated regression where p-values for the statistics are also provided. The same conclusions generally hold in both the direct and reverse regressions. The null hypothesis of no difference in auditor-specific ERCs pre-Enron is not rejected. This result accords with earlier Australian findings (Ferguson, Francis and Stokes, 2003) that while auditor reputation effects reflected in audit fee premiums exist at the office level, based on industry expertise, they do not exist at the firm level.
However, in the direct regression Post-Enron, there is some evidence of the market responding differentially to earnings signals across auditors and the null of no differences is rejected at a slightly greater than conventional level of significance (p= 0.1168).
We also test the restriction that ERCs are equal pre-and post-Enron at the individual auditor level and for all auditors as a group. In both the direct and reverse regressions it is possible to conclude that the post-Enron ERCs are smaller than the pre-Enron ERCs. Taken together, post-Enron ERCs are smaller than those in the preEnron period and the null of no difference is rejected at very high levels of significance for both regressions. In terms of the theoretical analysis, this result is consistent with an increase in the noise associated with earnings signals post-Enron reflecting a reduction in perceived reliability. The tests at the individual auditor level confirm this finding for the Big-5 in the reverse regression.
Endogeneity
To deal with the possibility that the post-Enron earnings measurement and reporting process was influenced by Enron we control for endogeneity by an instrumental variables approach to the direct regression. The results are reported in Table 4 . We use semi-annual earnings as the instrument for annual earnings in the final year. We allow the risk premium to be freely estimated in a non-linear direct More importantly, we also find that the estimated risk premium has risen significantly in the post-Enron period. This is consistent with the view that information quality is a factor that enters into systematic risk. It is unlikely that this result arises from the purely statistical effects of adding the instrument. Instruments usually affect the efficiency of estimates and not their expected level.
Conclusions
This paper gives rigorous underpinnings to the analysis of information processing around the Enron crisis. We demonstrate analytically that, in the dynamic context, an impact-decline in earnings response coefficients (ERCs) must imply a decline in the quality of post-Enron information. The empirical implementation of our analysis introduces a number of innovations. In contrast to the existing literature we estimate the empirical analogue of Bayesian weights of our theoretical analysis. This required that we separately consider the capitalization of earnings. To achieve this empirically we used a non-linear estimation method that allowed for the joint estimation of risk adjusted capitalization factors and ERCs. The capitalization also controlled for market-to-book, leverage and size effects. We also deal with the issues of measurement error and endogeneity respectively by the use of a reverse regression and the instrumentation of post-Enron earnings with their semi-annual counterparts.
Having dealt with theoretical and estimation issues our findings indicate the extent of the impact and legacy of the Enron crisis. A systematic decline in the perceived reliability of earnings signals post-Enron was found to apply across all auditors and, conditional on instrumenting for endogeneity, this was combined with a rise in the market risk-premium.
The apparent fall in the quality of the information environment has adverse implications for the US audit industry and for accounting regulators. Our findings suggest that there was a fall in confidence in the quality of accounting information as a result of the Enron scandal. The reputation gap between the most reputable auditor post-Enron and the least reputable auditor pre-Enron far exceeds the reputation gap between the most and least reputable auditors in the pre-crisis period. This identifies and quantifies the extent of the problem facing auditors and regulators in restoring confidence in audited information post-Enron.
In terms of the international competitiveness of US capital markets our study identifies a significant rise (50%) in the market-wide risk premium post-Enron. This has consequences for the attractiveness of the US as a source of capital internationally particularly if the effects of the crisis were confined to the US market. An issue for future research is whether there has been contagion arising from the crisis to other capital markets.
Appendices
Appendix 1: Information Processing, Scenario 2
Assume t P is the market value of an asset following earnings announcements for period t. Let t V be the unknown fundamental, or fair-value of the asset at the same time. Let t y be the unobservable economic earnings associated with the asset and γ be a suitable capitalization factor such that for all periods, 
Where 2 e k k φ σ = + , and k , or 1 (ln ln )
, is the variance of the prior.
Rearranging and lagging gives the following expression for 1
Where L is a lag operator such that
Assume for now that 1 ln t P − has expected value equal to ln t V (this is explicitly confirmed as part of the following proof). Using this expression it is possible to obtain a tractable solution for the variance k. Note that the variance can be stated as follows;
( ) 
or more generally;
Thus, we can expand one of the expressions in (A3) as follows;
(1 ) ln (1 ) (1 ) ln (
Notice that the expected value of this is ln t V as assumed above. Returning now to the expression (A3) we can express the variance in question as;
This is, 
Replacing k in equation (A10) 
We can now revert back to a quadratic expression for k by substituting 
Simplification of this expression gives the following quadratic; 
Under the assumption that the covariance term is zero we obtain equation (3) We assume that the covariance term is zero. This gives rise to two possible solutions for k but only one of these gives rise to a positive value for this variance. This is;
( ) (1 (1 ) ) σ as subjective objects, our analysis can be extended to allow the Enron event to affect both of these subjective variances.
Although this presents some interesting avenues for investigation, we expect that the Enron event will have affected ERCs. In the case of B both pre-and post-Enron information is viewed as less reliable but the perceived deterioration of pre-Enron information is significantly greater than the perceived deterioration of post-Enron information. In the case of C both pre-and post-Enron information is viewed as less reliable but the perceived deterioration of pre-Enron information is less than the perceived deterioration of post-Enron information. D is an intermediate case. Table 2 Descriptive statistics: P r e -D e m e a n e d D a t a D e -M e a n e d D a t a M e a n M e d i a n S t D e v M i n M a Table reports descriptive statistics for raw and demeaned data and correlation coefficients for the demeaned data. RET is the annual % return, calculated by compounding the monthly returns starting from 3 months after the accounting year-end. EBEI is the % change in income before extraordinary items scaled by market value at the beginning of the period. Size is the natural log of total assets. MTB is the market to book ratio, calculated as the market value of equity scaled by the book value of assets. LEV is leverage, calculated as long-term debt scaled by total capital employed. Detailed variable definitions are reported in Table 1 . and RES= all others. Market-to-book, Leverage and Size variables are demeaned for time only while returns and earnings are demeaned for time and sectoral fixed-effects. ***, ** and * denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. In the case of the reverse regression results, we list the ranking of the ERC (in size terms) next to the explanatory variable name. Wald tests of restrictions that are reported have Chi-Squared distributions under the null. P-values for these test statistics are given in brackets. All tests are conducted subject to robust estimation for heteroscedasticity. (7) 228.802 (p=0.0000)
Notes
The Table reports the results of the direct nonlinear regression involving unexpected returns (RET) and unexpected earnings (EBEI). In the case of the post-Enron period the earnings are instrumented by semi-annual earnings. Multiplicative auditor dummies are included for the pre and post Enron periods to capture auditor specific ERCs where the auditors are denoted as follows; KPM=KPMG, AND=Andersen, DEL=Deloitte & Touche, ERN=Ernst & Young, PWC=PricewaterhouseCoopers and RES= all others. Market-to-book, Leverage and Size variables are demeaned for time only while returns and earnings are demeaned for time and sectoral fixed-effects. ***, ** and * denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. Wald tests of restrictions that are reported have Chi-Squared distributions under the null. P-values for these test statistics are given in brackets. All tests are conducted subject to robust estimation for heteroscedasticity. The Hausman test for the significance of the instruments is also provided.
Endnotes 1 This is also predicated on the assumption that investors are incapable of decomposing t z into its components (or estimates of the components). Note that under certain assumptions about ( ) t t Cov e d it would be possible to decompose the signal into its permanent and transitory components (see, e.g., Beveridge and Nelson 1981 and Watson 1986) . We assume that the typical investor does not possess knowledge of this covariance and cannot decompose the signal but we assume that the variance of the noise in the signal 2 e σ can be estimated and we regard this as public knowledge.
2 In doing so we ignore the fact that the variance process itself can be regarded as reviseable in the light of new information (see Harvey 1989) . 3 Chaney and Philipich (2002) find no significant abnormal market reaction to Andersen's clients in either November or December 2001, but find an adversely significant reaction in January 2002. 4 An example from Collins and Kothari (1989, page 160 ) is an inverse-ERC of 5.8 (standard error 0.34). If we assume a capitalization factor of 10 this implies a Bayesian weight of (0.58) -1 or 1.72.
